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Abstract 
The IIASA-WEC study global energy perspectives emphasized trends toward cleaner, more flexible, and more convenient final 
energy forms , delivered chiefly by energy grids, and noted potential energy infrastructure deficiencies in Eurasia. We compare planned 
interregional gas pipelines and LNG terminals in Eurasia with the study's projected trade flows for 2020. We focus on the study's three 
high-growth scenarios and single middle course scenario. The comparison indicates that high gas consumption in a scenario need not 
imply high gas trade. For the former Soviet Union, a robust strategy across all six scenarios is to implement existing plans and 
proposals for expanding gas export capacity. For Eastern Europe, significant import capacity expansions beyond current plans and 
proposals are needed in all but the middle course scenario. Western European plans and proposals need to be increased only in two 
high gas consumption scenarios. Planned and proposed capacities for the Middle East (exports) and centrally planned Asia (imports) 
most closely match a high gas trade scenario, but are otherwise excessive. Paradoxically, for the Pacific OECD, more short-term 
import capacity is needed in scenarios with low gas consumption than in high-consumption scenarios. For Southeast Asia, proposed 
import capacities are significantly higher than scenario trade projections. © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
Keywords: G as; Infrastructure; Eurasia 
I. Introduction 
The IIASA-WEC 1 study global energy perspectives 
emphasized, first , a persistent and pervasive trend in 
consumer demand toward cleaner, more flexible, and 
more convenient final energy forms, chiefly delivered by 
energy grids (Nakicenovic et al., 1998). Second, it identi-
fied Asia, particularly China and South Asia, as the likely 
world leaders in energy consumption growth, and drew 
attention to potentially important energy infrastructure 
deficiencies in Eurasia. 
The purpose of this paper is to compare existing, 
planned, and proposed Eurasian infrastructures for natu-
ral gas transport, i.e., pipelines and LNG facilities, to 
interregional trade flows in the six IIASA-WEC scen-
arios. We address two questions: (1) How well do current 
plans and proposals match each of the scenarios? (2) Are 
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World Energy Council. 
there robust strategies that are attractive across all six 
scenarios? 
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 de-
scribes gas production, gas consumption, and gas trade 
flows under the IIASA-WEC scenarios. Section 3 reviews 
planned and proposed gas pipelines and LNG facilities in 
Eurasia. Section 4 compares projected interregional gas 
export and import capacities with those resulting from 
the IIASA-WEC scenarios. Section 5 concludes and dis-
cusses the results. 
2. Gas consumption and trade flows in the IIASA-WEC 
scenarios 
2.1. Introduction 
Eurasia includes seven of the eleven regions defined in 
the IIASA-WEC study. These are, as shown in Fig. 1, 
Pacific OECD (PAO), Centrally planned Asia and China 
(CPA), South Asia (SAS), Other Pacific Asia (PAS), New-
ly independent states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), 
Central and Eastern Europe (EEU), and Western Europe 
(WEU). This section consists of three parts. First, it 
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introduces the six scenarios of the IIASA-WEC study. 
Second it examines energy demand and supply for Eur-
asia. Finally, it looks at gas consumption and production 
as well as gas trade flows in Eurasia under the different 
scenanos. 
2.2. The global outlook 
The six IIASA-WEC scenarios are divided into three 
cases. Case A presents a future of impressive technolo-
gical improvements and consequent high economic 
growth. Case B describes a future with less ambitious, 
though perhaps more realistic, technological improve-
ments, and consequently more intermediate economic 
growth. Case C presents a "rich and green" future. It 
includes both substantial technological progress and un-
precedented international cooperation, including major 
resource transfers from North to South centered specifi-
cally on environmental protection and international 
equity. These are driven by explicit policies, including 
carbon taxes, to reduce global carbon emissions in 2100 
to two gigatons of carbon (GtC), one-third the level of 
global emissions in 1990. Key characteristics of the three 
cases are given in Table 1. 
Technology parameters were varied within Case A to 
produce three scenarios, and within Case C to produce 
two scenarios, as follows. In Scenario Al, investments 
and technological progress focus on oil and gas, and the 
future availability of oil and gas resources is relatively 
high. As a result the dominance of oil and gas is per-
petuated to the end of the 21st century. At the other end 
of the spectrum, Scenario A2 assumes oil and gas re-
sources to be scarce and investments and technological 
progress to favor coal. The result is a massive return to 
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1 NAM North America 5 WEU Western Europe 
2 LAM Latin America and the Caribbean 
3 AFR Sub-Saharan Africa 
4 MEA Middle East and North Africa 
6 EEU Central and Eastern Europe 
7 FSU Newly independent states of 
the former Soviet Union 
8 CPA Centrally planned Asia and China 
9 SAS South Asia 
10 PAS Other Pacific Asia 
11 PAO Pacific OECD 
Fig. I. IIASA-WEC study regions. Countries are divided among regions as follows. NAM: Canada, Guam, Puerto Rico, United States of America, and 
Virgin Islands. LAM: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, French Guyana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Martinique, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Santa Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. AFR: Angola, Benin, Botswana, British Indian Ocean Territory, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozam-
bique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Saint Helena, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. MEA: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt (Arab Republic), Iraq, Iran (Islamic Republic), 
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya/SPLAJ, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria (Arab Republic), Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, 
and Yemen. WEU: Andorra, Austria , Azores, Belgium, Canary Islands, Channel Islands, Cyprus, Denmark, Faeroe Islands, Finland, France, 
Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madeira, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom. EEU: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, The former Yugoslav Rep. of Macedonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Yugoslavia. FSU: Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia. Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenis-
tan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. CPA: Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Korea (DPR), Lao (PDR), Mongolia, and Vietnam. SAS: Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. PAS: American Samoa, Brunei Darussalam, Fiji, French Polynesia, Gilbert-
Kiribati , Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Taiwan, 
China, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa. PAO: Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. 
G. Klaassen et al. / Energy Policy 29 (2001) 399-413 401 
Table I 
Summary of the three IIASA-WEC cases in 2050 and 2100 compared with 1990 (GWP =gross world product, Gtoe = gigatons oil equivalent, and 
GtC = gigatons of carbon). Source: Nakicenovic et al. (1998) 
Case 
A 
High growth 
Population, billion 
1990 5.3 
2050 10.1 
2100 11.7 
GWP, trillion US(J990)$ 
1990 20 
2050 100 
2100 300 
Global primary energy intensity improvement, Medium 
percent per year 
1990 to 2050 - 0.9 
1990 to 2100 - 1.0 
Primary energy demand, Gtoe 
1990 9 
2050 25 
2100 45 
Resource availability 
Fossil High 
Non-fossil High 
Technology costs 
Fossil Low 
Non-fossil Low 
Technology dynamics 
Fossil High 
Non-fossil High 
Environmental taxes No 
CO, emission constraint No 
Net carbon emissions, GtC 
1990 6 
2050 9-15 
2100 6-20 
Number of scenarios 3 
Al - oil & gas 
A2 - coal 
A3 - "bio-nuke" 
coal. Finally, in Scenario A3 rapid technological change 
in nuclear and renewable energy technologies results in 
a phaseout of fossil fuels for economic reasons rather 
than due to resource scarcity. However, natural gas 
proves very important as a transitional fuel in Scenario 
A3 - so much so that both gas use and gas trade are 
generally higher in Scenario A3 than even in the oil-and-
gas-intensive Scenario Al. In Case C, which is the most 
optimistic about technology and geopolitics, nuclear en-
ergy is at a crossroads, and two scenarios are included. In 
Scenario Cl nuclear power proves a transient technology 
that is eventually phased out entirely by the end of the 
21st century. In Scenario C2 a new generation of nuclear 
B c 
Middle course Ecologically driven 
5.3 5.3 
JO.I 10.1 
11.7 11.7 
20 20 
75 75 
200 220 
Low High 
-0.8 - 1.4 
- 0.8 - 1.4 
9 9 
20 14 
35 21 
Medium Low 
Medium High 
Medium High 
Medium Low 
Medium Medium 
Medium High 
No Yes 
No Yes 
6 6 
10 5 
II 2 
2 
CI - nuclear phaseout 
C2 - new nuclear 
reactors is developed that is inherently safe and small 
scale - 100- 300 megawatts electric (MWe) installed. 
The differences among Scenarios A 1- A3 lead to differ-
ent fuel mixes (and hence different carbon emissions), but 
in terms of all the parameters in Table 1 except carbon 
emissions (e.g., economic growth, primary energy de-
mand, and energy intensity improvements), all three Case 
A scenarios are identical. For Case C, the common car-
bon constraint means that Scenarios Cl and C2 are 
identical for all the parameters listed in Table 1. 
Although the improvement rates for different fossil and 
non-fossil energy technologies - from exploration 
through transport and end-use - are different in the 
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different scenarios, one important feature of the gas 
transport market is constant across the scenarios. Gas 
trade in Eurasia can currently be characterized by two 
relatively distinct regional markets, a European or west-
ern market and an Asian Pacific or eastern market. In 
particular, there are currently no pipelines connecting the 
European and Asian Pacific markets, although LNG 
trade is always more flexible. The distinction, at least in 
terms of pipeline connections, is maintained in all six 
IIASA-WEC scenarios. In addition to this principal 
distinction into two broad regional markets it is also 
important to keep in mind that there are a number of 
important sub-markets such as Japan, Russia, Western 
Europe and Eastern Europe. 
Turning to the scenario results, primary energy use in 
all six scenarios grows substantially, as shown in Table 1. 
The pattern of final energy use is remarkably consistent 
across scenarios, with all three cases reflecting a continu-
ing pervasive shift toward energy reaching consumers in 
increasingly flexible, convenient, and clean forms de-
livered through energy grids - gas, electricity, and, in the 
long term, hydrogen. Concerning the structure of pri-
mary energy supply, the significant result is that there is 
a wide range of supply structures that can successfully 
match the persistent final energy trends toward conveni-
ence, cleanliness, and grids. The range of primary energy 
supply structures is shown in Fig. 2. Each corner of the 
triangle corresponds to a hypothetical situation in which 
all primary energy is supplied by a single category of 
fuels: oil and gas at the top, coal at the left, and non-fossil 
sources (renewables and nuclear) at the right. 
Because of the long lifetimes of power plants, refineries, 
and other energy investments, there is not enough capital 
stock turnover in the scenarios prior to 2020 to allow 
them to diverge significantly. But after 2020 all scenarios 
move away from their current reliance on conventional 
oil and gas. This transition progresses relatively slowly in 
Scenario A 1 where oil and gas are plentiful. In Scenario 
A3 and Case C, it progresses more rapidly, while in 
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Fig. 2. Evolution of primary energy structure, shares of oil and gas, 
coal , and non-fossil sources, in percent, historical development from 
1850 to 1990 (triangles) and in scenarios to 2020 (open circles), 2050 
(diamonds), and 2100 (closed circles). 
Scenario A2 and Case B, the transition away from oil and 
gas includes an important contribution from coal, whose 
long-term market share after 2050 ranges between 20 and 
40%. Nonetheless, little of this coal is used directly. It is 
instead converted to the high-quality energy carriers 
(electricity, liquids, and gases) demanded by the high-
income consumers of the second half of the 21st century. 
Fig. 3 shows global gas consumption and interregional 
gas trade across the six scenarios, where "interregional" 
refers to trade across any of the boundaries of the eleven 
multi-country regions shown in Fig. 1. The term thus 
includes both gas that is traded across many thousands 
of kilometers (e.g., from Siberia to Europe) as well as gas 
that travels only tens or hundreds of kilometers (e.g., 
from Iran to Turkey, or from Libya to Italy. Scenario A3 
has the highest gas consumption for all but the final time 
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Fig. 3. World gas consumption (left) and total interregional gas imports (right) in the six IIASA-WEC scenarios. 
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step in the models and also the highest, or near the 
highest, interregional gas imports through 2080. The 
dominance of gas is transitional as Scenario A3 eventually 
shifts to non-fossil energy sources. 
High gas consumption does not always imply high 
trade levels. In Scenario A 1 in Fig. 3, gas consumption 
grows steeply and steadily after 2050 and has the highest 
value of the six scenarios by 2100. But throughout this 
50-year surge in gas consumption, gas trade stays essen-
tially flat. This is because the production expansions 
(particularly of unconventional gas) needed to meet the 
surge in consumption are not all concentrated in the 
current exporting regions. Increased production in im-
porting as well exporting regions, in line with Scenario 
Al's focus on oil and gas investments, means that in-
creased use does not translate directly into increased 
imports. 
Conversely, the scenario with the flattest gas consump-
tion trajectory, Case B, leads to steadily rising interreg-
ional trade right through 2100. By 2080 Case B's gas 
trade is the highest of all six scenarios. Case B is a scen-
ario with quite modest technological progress and no 
particular focus on gas development. The result is that 
there is much less of a contribution from new gas produc-
tion in importing regions, and future gas production is 
largely from the same regions as current gas production. 
FSU and the Middle East and North Africa (MEA) 
continue as the big exporters, and Fig. 3's pattern of 
essentially flat global consumption after 2040 with in-
creasing trade means export expansions in FSU and 
M EA are making up for declining production in other 
regions. 
Note also that global gas trade is very similar in 
Scenarios A2 and A3 - i.e., in both the dirtiest (in terms 
of carbon emissions) and the cleanest of the study's high-
growth scenarios. But while Scenarios A2 and A3 are 
similar in terms of gas trade, gas consumption is much 
lower in the coal-intensive Scenario A2. The A2 Scenario 
is, in this sense, somewhat similar to Case B. Low invest-
ments in gas technologies and exploration mean little in 
the way of new supplies in importing regions in the 
second-half of the century after current prospects are 
exhausted. Because Scenario A2 has higher economic 
growth and energy demand than Case B, there is 
a greater need for gas as a transition fuel until technolo-
gies for converting coal to clean synfuels are perfected 
and widespread. But precisely because widespread use of 
new coal technologies is the eventual result of early coal 
technology investments in Scenario A2, there is less need 
for gas in the long run. 
In this paper we focus on Cases A and B since there is 
currently little prospect of the large near-term North-to-
South resource transfers and purposeful preference for 
non-fossil fuels that is assumed to have started in 1990 in 
the two Case C scenarios. But they too are an example of 
divergence between gas trade and consumption. In Fig. 3, 
Scenarios Cl and C2 are quite similar in terms of con-
sumption throughout the planning horizon, but from 
about 2030 to 2080 gas trade is significantly higher in the 
nuclear-phaseout Scenario Cl. 
2.3. The outlook for Eurasia 
For the five gas-importing Eurasian regions, WEU, 
EEU, CPA, PAO, and SAS, Fig. 4 shows consumption 
and imports across the IIASA-WEC scenarios. Fig. 5 
shows gas consumption and exports for the two export-
ing Eurasian regions, FSU and PAS, and for another 
region, the Middle East and North Africa (MEA), much 
of whose gas exports go to Eurasia. 
Many of the regions shown in Figs. 4 and 5 reflect 
the global patterns in Fig. 3. Gas consumption and 
trade are often highest and transitional in Scenario A3, 
for example, as in the global totals shown in Fig. 3. 
But the regional disaggregation also reinforces the 
point in Section 2.2 that the relationship between 
projected consumption and trade is not entirely straight-
forward. 
There are two regions in Eurasian that might be called 
"paradox regions" because gas use and gas trade appear, 
in certain periods, to be inversely related. High use im-
plies low trade and vice versa. The two regions are FSU 
(a gas exporting region) and PAO (a gas importing re-
gion). Fig. S's graphs for FSU show that while gas ex-
ports rise together through 2020 in all scenarios, exports 
then start to drop in Scenario A3 as the scenario's early 
investments in gas technologies and exploration begin to 
take effect. The export trajectory for Scenario A 1, the 
high-growth oil-and-gas-intensive scenario follows essen-
tially the same pattern. This drop in exports is evidently 
the result of a strong preference for gas as a fuel within 
FSU. We know it is not because of decreased import 
demand elsewhere, given the surge in imports shown for 
Scenario A3 in the right panel of Fig. 3. As also seen in 
Fig. 5, MEA is the principal beneficiary of FSU's 
post-2020 retreat from the export market. 
While Scenarios Al and A3 present a high-consump-
tion/low-export paradox in FSU, Case B, and to a lesser 
extent Scenario A2, present the opposite paradox, low-
use/high-export. In these scenarios the lack of new gas 
developments in importing regions and the lower priority 
given to gas technologies at home mean that FSU's gas 
resources are relatively more valuable to the region as an 
export commodity than as a fuel for domestic consump-
tion. Thus gas exports and gas export revenues rise, while 
increases in domestic demand are largely covered by 
coal. 
The other "paradox region" is PAO. Note that while 
PAO is a net gas-importing region, it includes one gas-
importing country, Japan, one exporter, Australia, as 
well as New Zealand. Thus long-term projections of no 
net regional imports, as occur in all but Case C (see 
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Fig. 4), may still involve significant Japanese imports and 
Australian exports. Paradoxical trends in gas consump-
tion and trade are most vivid for Scenarios Al and A3 in 
the long term. PAO gas consumption in both takes off in 
the second-half of the century, following first modest 
growth through 2020 and then stability until 2050 or 
2060. But regional imports after 2050 drop to zero. The 
reason is the long-term development of particularly 
unconventional gas resources in the region. Conversely, 
Scenario A2 and Case B have the highest near-term 
gas import requirements, but relatively flat long-term 
demand trajectories. 
Gas consumption and trade trends in MEA and the 
five Eurasian regions other than FSU and PAO are less 
paradoxical. High projected consumption generally cor-
responds to either high projected imports (WEU, EEU, 
CPA, and SAS) or high projected exports (PAS and 
MEA). For the importing regions consumption and trade 
are generally highest in Scenario A3, while showing 
a definite transitional pattern, peaking first in WEU 
(2040 for imports), then in CPA (2050), EEU (2060), and 
SAS (2070). For the other scenarios, there is more re-
gional diversity. In the coal-intensive Scenario A2, for 
example, gas has almost as important a role in WEU as it 
has in Scenario A3. But in CPA, which has much larger 
coal resources, Scenario A2 means a much diminished 
role for gas. 
Except for CPA, very long-term imports and con-
sumption tend to be highest in Case B, where slow 
technological progress creates relatively little in the way 
of new gas supplies in the importing regions or alterna-
tive technologies and fuels. The short-term divergence in 
import projections (through 2020) is, in relative terms, 
highest in CPA and, in absolute terms, highest in WEU. 
There is effectively no short-term divergence in the pro-
jections for SAS, a feature of the scenarios that should 
probably be revisited, particularly in light of the com-
parison below between SAS's modest near-term imports 
406 G. Klaassen et al. / Energy Policy 29 (2001) 399-413 
as shown in Fig. 4 and more ambitious existing plans for 
expanding the import infrastructure. 
For MEA, Scenario A3 is the most lucrative in terms of 
export volumes, as MEA gas exports fuel much of the 
transitional surge in gas use shown in Fig. 4 for all the 
importing regions. Domestically, MEA also makes good 
use of its gas resources to fuel long-term economic 
growth in the high-growth scenarios with faster progress 
in gas technologies (Al and A3). Very long-term exports 
are highest in Case B, whose slower economic growth 
and technological progress leaves more gas in the 
ground, fewer competing supplies, and fewer alternative 
fuel sources. PAS also cashes in on Scenario A3's 
transition surge in gas use through about 2040. It then 
uses its gas resources increasingly for its own purposes, 
and in the very long-term shifts to non-fossil fuels. In all 
other scenarios initial growth in gas exports is more 
modest and exports start to decline sooner - after 2020. 
In presenting in this section results of the IIASA-WEC 
scenarios all the way out to 2100, we recognize we have 
moved into a highly uncertain and somewhat speculative 
area. For near-term planning and investments, projec-
tions through 2020 or 2030 are much more pertinent 
than what might happen by 2100. Therefore, we turn to 
current infrastructure plans and proposals. Nonetheless, 
as some of the panels in Figs. 4 and 5 show (e.g., the 
import decreases after 2020 in PAO), the long term may 
sometimes be closer than we think. 
3. Planned and proposed gas transmission infrastructures 
3.1. Introduction 
This section reviews the past evolution and short-term 
prospects of international gas transmission networks in 
Eurasia. The focus will be on interregional gas infrastruc-
tures, i.e., those infrastructures that link one IIASA-WEC 
world region to another IIASA-WEC region in Eurasia. 
Together the seven Eurasian IIASA-WEC regions ac-
counted for 60% of gas demand in 1990. We will start by 
looking at gas transmission lines followed by a survey of 
LNG shipping facilities. 
3.2. The diffusion of existing gas transmission lines 
in Eurasia 
Currently, Eurasia can be divided in two regional gas 
markets. The European market ranges from North Africa 
through Europe up to West Siberia. WEU, EEU and 
FSU itself are the major consumers in this market. Major 
supplies come from FSU, from WEU itself (Norway, 
Netherlands, and United Kingdom) as well as North 
Africa (Algeria). The major means of transport is gas 
transmission pipelines. The second market is the Asian 
Pacific market consisting of CPA, PAS, SAS, and PAO. 
The major consumer in this market is Japan (in PAO) 
followed by South Korea and Taiwan. In this region gas 
is supplied mainly as LNG. Major suppliers in 1998 were 
Indonesia and Malaysia (PAS). Smaller amounts were 
exported by Australia, Brunei, and the Middle East 
(Qatar and UAE) (BPAmoco, 1999). 
The gas pipeline from Saratov to Moscow, a 482-mile 
pipeline with a capacity of 500 million cubic meters 
annually, constructed in 1946, is regarded as the starting 
point of the modern Russian and European gas industry 
(Petroleum Economist, 1996). In Western Europe, natu-
ral gas supply was first local and gradually reached 
a national scale in some countries only in the 1950s 
(CEDIGAZ, 1995; Stern, 1998). The discovery of the 
Groningen field in the Netherlands in the early 1960s, 
which provided gas to the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Germany, France, and later Italy, marked the beginning 
of the development of a vast network of international 
pipelines. In Europe, the construction of international 
gas transmission pipelines proceeded rapidly between 
1970 and 1990. The early 1970s saw a period of strong 
growth of pipelines transporting Soviet gas into Western 
and Southeastern Europe (Transgas). In the mid-1970s, 
Norway built its first offshore pipelines from the North 
Sea through the Frigg and Norpipe systems to supply the 
United Kingdom and continental European buyers; this 
was the first international movement of North Sea gas to 
Europe. In 1980 another major pipeline (Orenburg/ 
Soyus) from Russia to central and east European coun-
tries was built. At the same time, the Mega! line from 
Russia through Germany, France, and Austria was 
completed to transport Soviet gas to Western Europe. 
The Trans-Mediterranean pipeline system from Algeria 
to Italy, completed in 1983, provided the capacity for 
natural gas piping from Algeria to Western Europe. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, major gas pipelines 
were built for: 
• Soviet gas to Western and Eastern Europe from 
Urengoy (1984) and Yamburg/ Progress (1988); 
• Norwegian gas through the Statpipe (1986), Zeepipe 
I (1993), and Europipe (1995); and 
• Algerian gas through the Bazoduc Maghreb-Europe 
(GME) line (1996) to Spain. 
In the mid-1990s, pipelines were built between Britain 
and both parts of Ireland, and between Britain and 
continental Europe. The Balkan systems linking Bulgaria 
to Macedonia and then to Greece were completed in 
1995 and 1996. Currently, the European gas market is the 
world's most complex in terms of the number of interna-
tional participants. More than 47% of the gas consumed 
in Western Europe crosses at least two borders before 
reaching its final destination (Energy Charter, 1998). 
Fig. 6 depicts the development of the total capacity of 
interregional gas transmission pipelines in Eurasia 
through mid-1999. Initial interregional exports started in 
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Fig. 6. The diffusion of existing interregional gas transmission pipelines 
in Eurasia. 
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Strubegger (1984), Stern (1998, 1999) and Zhao (2000). 
the early 1960s with Russian gas exports to Poland. The 
real upsurge started in the 1970s when the export capa-
city of FSU increased significantly and transit capacity 
through the EEU increased as well. Transmission capa-
city from MEA (Algeria) took off in the 1980s. Total 
capacity is around 250 bcm per year. 
Currently, there are no interregional gas transmission 
lines in Asia (excluding the Asian part of FSU) and 
natural gas is a relatively new source of energy, averaging 
around 12% of total energy consumption (BPAmoco, 
1999). Shipping LNG has so far been the main means of 
gas transportation. At present, Malaysia is the only 
country in the region that has initiated gas trade by 
pipeline. In 1992, Malaysia began to export gas by pipe-
line, delivering 1.5 bcm/year of gas to Singapore through 
a 70 km long pipeline (CEDIGAZ, 1995). Countries like 
China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan have 
domestic gas pipelines in place (Zhao, 2000). In China the 
860-km pipeline that transmits gas from the Ordos basin 
to Beijing is now the country's second longest gas pipe-
line (Lan and Paik, 1998). Asia's longest offshore gas 
pipeline is the Ya 13-1 Hong Kong pipeline, which trans-
fers 4 bcm/year of gas from China's Yinggehai basin to 
a power plant in Hong Kong. 
3.3. Proposed and planned gas transmission pipelines 
In the European part of the Eurasian gas market, the 
Yamal-Europe project will open a new export corridor 
between Russia and Western Europe, while Turkmenis-
tan's export plans could provide new routes for gas 
export to Europe. The discovery of large gas reserves on 
the Yamal Peninsula is the basis for Russia's planned gas 
exports to Eastern (Poland) and Western Europe. The 
project consists of up to three parallel lines that will 
extend over 5000 km westward from Yamal, running 
across Russia, Belarus, and Poland to the German bor-
der. Turkmenistan, one of the largest gas producing 
countries in the world, besides exporting to present 
markets (the trans-Caucasian republics, Kazakhstan, 
Ukraine, and Russia), plans to build new gas export 
outlets to such areas as Pakistan, India, Western Europe, 
China, Japan, and Korea. In addition to building new gas 
pipelines, Russia and other CIS countries have to recon-
struct or reinforce their existing gas pipelines and build 
gas storage facilities. Additional gas pipelines are pro-
posed from Norway to European importers, and the 
United Kingdom has become a new gas supplier to 
Europe since the operation of the interconnector (Zhao, 
2000). In addition, interregional gas pipelines from gas-
rich Russia, Turkmenistan, and the Middle East also are 
proposed. All planned and proposed pipelines (as of 
September 1999) are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2 also shows plans and proposals for the Asian 
Pacific region, in which proposed gas pipelines will trans-
fer gas either from existing gas fields within the Asian 
regions, e.g., gas fields in Myanmar, Vietnam, Indonesia, 
and Malaysia, or from gas fields in Russia or Central 
Asia. The proposed pipelines in the Asian Pacific region 
are generally smaller than those in Europe, with 
diameters between 500 and 1000 mm. New piped gas 
imports from Malaysia, Myanmar, and Indonesia are 
proposed to make up shortfalls in Thailand's and the 
Philippines' gas supplies that remain despite their recent 
discoveries of additional gas reserves. Singapore has 
sought to take a further 1 million cubic meters per day 
from Malaysia and to diversify supplies via pipeline from 
Indonesia (CEDIGAZ, 1995). If the Trans-ASEAN pipe-
line becomes a reality, east Malaysia could be the largest 
gas supplier in the Asian Pacifip region. In addition to 
obtaining gas from this region, India and Pakistan are 
considering importing gas from the Middle East, while 
China, Japan, and Korea are planning to transport gas 
from Russia and Turkmenistan. In 1997, Unocal an-
nounced that Pakistan would be linked to Turkmenistan 
in a Central Asia Gas Pipeline project. The 1270-km 
pipeline would deliver up to 2 bcm per year to Multan of 
Pakistan (EIA, 1998). China continues to build domestic 
pipelines connecting western gas producing regions to 
eastern gas-demand regions. In addition, two interna-
tional pipelines to bring gas from Russia and Turkmenis-
tan are proposed. Both pipelines would serve the eastern 
coastal region of China and possibly extend to Japan and 
South Korea (Zhao, 2000). 
Altogether, Table 2 shows over 61,000 km of interreg-
ional gas transmission pipelines planned or proposed. 
Table 2 also includes information on the status of the 
projects to indicate the likelihood of their implementa-
tion: probable (very likely to happen because agreement 
signed and/or feasibility study completed), possible 
(could happen) or speculative (unlikely and little progress 
made). The total capacity of all projects would be at least 
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Table 2 
Planned/proposed interregional gas transmission lines in Eurasia• 
Source Destination Status Region Length (km) Capacity (bcm/year) 
INTERREGIONAL 
Vietnam Thailand Possible CPA-PAS 750 7 
Yamal-Russia West-Polish border Probable FSU-WEU 4170 83 
Shtockmanovkoye Finland/Russia Possible FSU-WEU 2268 25 
Shatlyk-Turkmenistan Erzerum-Turkey Possible FSU-WEU 2700 31 
Turkmenistan Turkey-border Possible FSU-WEU 1260 10 
Russia (Bluestream) Turkey Probable FSU-WEU 400 17 
Turkmenistan China, Japan, S. Korea Speculative FSU-CPA 7000 28 
Irkutsk-Russia China, Japan, S. Korea Speculative FSU-CPA 3360 32 
Yakutsk/Sakhalin-Russia China, S.Korea, Japan Speculative FSU-CPA 3900 20 
Sakhalin-Russia Niigata-Japan and to Korea FSU-PAO 1300 n.a. 
Turkmenistan Lultan-Pakistan Speculative FSU-SAS 1271 20 
Turkmenistan Multan-Pakistan Speculative FSU-SAS 1500 n.a. 
Turkmenistan Persian Gulf Speculative FSU-MEA 2000 n.a. 
Libya Italy Probable MEA-WEU 550 9 
Syria Turkey Possible MEA-WEU 200 2 
Qatar Europe Speculative MEA-WEU 4900 30 
Iran Europe Possible MEA-WEU 4570 32 
Oman India Speculative MEA-SAS 1500 19 
Iran Armenia Possible MEA-FSU 160 2 
Iran Ukraine Possible MEA-FSU 1060 25 
Iran Pakistan Possible MEA-SAS 1600 9 
Iran (Bandar Abbas) India Possible MEA-SAS 2000 19 
Qatar Pakistan Possible MEA-SAS 1600 25 
ASEAN countries China, Taiwa n, Japan, Specula ti ve CPA-PAO 4300 n.a 
S. Korea 
North Sea,United Kingdom Niechorze-Poland Possible WEU-EEU 965 8 
(Polpipe) 
TOTAL 61284 > 452 
•source: Klaassen et al. (1999), CED!GAZ (1995), McMahon (1997) a nd Zhao (2000). 
450 bcm per year but around 130 bcm are regarded 
as speculative. Most projects are to originate in FSU 
or MEA and are directed at WEU, CPA, PAO 
(Japan), and SAS. This planned capacity is nearly 
twice as high as the current interregional transmission 
capacity. 
3.4. The diffusion and expansion of LNG terminals 
1964 marked the start of international LNG shipping 
with the finalization of the first LNG terminal in Algeria 
exporting LNG to Western Europe (EIA, 1998). Since 
then world trade in LNG has expanded rapidly from 
2.7 bcm in 1970 to 113 bcm in 1998 (CEDIGAZ, 1995; 
BP Amoco, 1999). As in the case of interregional gas trade 
via pipelines, two LNG market regions can be distin-
guished. The Asian market features imports from the 
Middle East (Qatar and UAE) as well as the Pacific 
region (Indonesia and Malaysia). Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Brunei rank as the world's biggest exporters of LNG, 
while Japan is the major imp-0rter of natural gas produc-
ed in the Asian Pacific rim countries. Out of 113 bcm of 
global LNG trade in 1998, Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan imported 85 bcm, accounting for 75% of the 
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Fig. 7. The diffusion of LNG export terminals in and into Eurasia. 
world total (BPAmoco, 1999). In the European market 
the principal supplier is Algeria, and the principal con-
sumer is Western Europe. Some Algerian gas is also 
exported to the United States (BPAmoco, 1999). Fig. 7 
shows the historical diffusion of LNG export terminals in 
or geared towards Eurasia. Although North Africa led 
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Table 3 
LNG capacities under construction and planned for the next five years• 
Region WEC Country 
Under Construction 
ASIA PAS Indonesia 
MIDDLE-EAST MEA Oman 
Total construction 
Planned 
AFRICA MEA Egypt 
AUSTRALIA PAO Australia 
AUSTRALIA PAO Australia 
ASIA PAS Indonesia 
ASIA PAS Indonesia 
ASIA PAS Malaysia 
FSU FSU Russia 
MIDDLE-EAST MEA Qatar 
MIDDLE-EAST MEA Yemen 
NORTH-AMERICA NMA Canada 
Total Planned 
PLANNED AND CONSTRUC-
TED 
'Source; CEDIGAZ (!999). 
development initially, PAS has now surpassed North 
Africa in terms of capacity. 
Expected capacity expansions in Eurasia are shown in 
Table 3. The table shows that an additional capacity of 
86 bcm is to be completed by 2005. The above capacity 
expansion is reasonably in line with other projections 
(IEA, 1998). Most of the capacity expansion will be 
geared towards the Asian Pacific region (PAO, CPA, and 
SAS) with export capacity expanding in Australia, In-
donesia, and the Middle East. Expected capacity addi-
tions in Latin America (Trinidad/Tobago) and Nigeria 
are partly geared towards exports to Western Europe 
and partly intended for North America. Canadian ex-
ports may also serve the Asian market. Available evid-
ence shows that India (part of SAS) has plans to import 
around 31 bcm of LNG, and China is preparing a tender 
for a terminal with a capacity of 4 bcm per year. PAS 
(Thailand and Taiwan) plans terminals to import around 
11 bcm annually (Alexander's Oil and Gas Connections, 
2000). Capacity expansions in Table 3 include both facili-
ties that are actually being constructed and those that are 
planned. Experience shows that not all the capacity in the 
latter category will necessarily materialize. In summary, 
the LNG market appears to be booming in Asia and 
becoming ever more global. 
3.5. Oi;erriew of both pipeline and LNG capacity 
Table 4 summarizes for Eurasia capacities both of 
existing pipeline and LNG facilities that are expected to 
still be in operation in 2020, and of planned or proposed 
facilities. While a number of existing pipelines are ex-
pected to still be in service in 2020, most of the projected 
Name Capacity (bcm/ year) Year 
Bontang H 4 2000 
Oman LNG Qalhat 9 2000 
13 
Port Said 10 2001 
Baya Undan 4 2003 
Gorgon LNG 12 2003 
Bontang I 0 
lrian Jaya 8 2003 
MLNG3 9 2001 
Sakhalin II 8 2005 
Ras Laffan 10 2001 
7 2001 
Pacific-Rim LNG 5 200 
74 
86 
pipeline capacity consists of pipelines still in the planning 
or proposal stages. The same is true for LNG facilities. 
While the contribution of LNG terminals is smaller than 
that of pipelines, the terminals included in Table 3 are all 
intended for completion by 2005. There is certainly 
enough time to plan and complete additional facilities, 
beyond those in the table, by 2020. The estimate of 
existing pipeline capacity depends on the lifetime as-
sumed and on whether lifetime extensions take place. 
4. Comparing existing plans with projections in the 
IIASA-WEC scenarios 
Table 5 compares interregional gas transport capaci-
ties, based on existing plans and proposals (see Table 4), 
with the interregional trade flows projected in 2020 for 
the six IIASA-WEC scenarios. In constructing the table 
planned import capacities of LNG have been taken as 
minimum constraints. Any LNG export capacity remain-
ing has been allocated to regions where deficit import 
capacity was highest so at to minimize the gap between 
planned and proposed capacities and the expected (net) 
imports under the different IIASA-WEC scenarios. 
For Eurasia as a whole, the 632 bcm of planned or 
proposed import capacity corresponds very well with 
expected gas imports in the IIASA-WEC high-growth 
Scenario A3. The same conclusion is valid for the plan-
ned or proposed export capacity. 
Looking at the results region-by-region, the first ques-
tion is whether there exists for each region a robust stra-
tegy, i.e., a strategy that makes sense no matter which of 
the IIASA-WEC scenarios proves the best approximation 
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Table 4 
LNG and pipeline (net import/export) capacities planned and proposed 
by 2020 (bcm) in and into Eurasia•·b 
Still existing pipeline 
capacity 
In 2020 
Imports 
WEU 66 (104) 
EEU 5 (37) 
CPA 0 (0) 
PAO 0 (0) 
SAS 0 (0) 
Exports 
FSU 52 (106) 
MEA 19 (35) 
PAS 0 
OTHERS 0 
'Note: - sign implies export. 
Planned pipelines 
In 2020 
181 
58 
53 
20 
92 
239 
172 
-7 
0 
bData in parenthesis represent capacity with lifetime of 40 years 
instead of 35 years. 
Table 5 
Sti'll existing LNG 
terminals in 2020 
28 
0 
0 
10 
0 
0 
18 
25 
12 
Planned and proposed Tota] capacity 
LNG in 2020 In 2020 
6 281 
0 63 
9 62 
73 103 
31 123 
8 299 
42 251 
34 52 
20 32 
Interregional (net) gas transport capacities in 2020 based on current plans and proposals (second column), projected 2020 imports and exports in the 
IIASA-WEC scenarios (middle columns), and projected 2050 imports and exports in the IIASA-WEC scenarios (right column), in bcm per year 
2020 
Total capacity Al A2 A3 
Imports 
WEU 281 286 270 328 
EEU 63 84 81 120 
CPA 62 30 4 84 
PAO 103 89 120 93 
SAS 123 18 18 18 
Exports 
FSU 299 304 288 281 
MEA 251 135 146 263 
PAS 52 67 64 88 
of future developments. Absent a one-size-fits-all-scen-
arios robust strategy for a region, the value of this sec-
tion's comparisons then lies in clarifying regional 
strategies for expanding gas transport capacities that 
match different scenarios. Does a strategy of rapidly 
expanding capacity, for example, constitute a bet on 
Scenario A3 being the best approximation of the future? 
Phrased slightly differently, if your strategy is one of 
rapidly expanding capacity, should you also be pushing 
on other fronts to raise the odds of a "Scenario A3" 
outcome, to improve the return on your investments? 
For FSU, there does exist a short-term robust strategy 
across the IIASA-WEC scenarios - continue with cur-
rent plans. As shown in Fig. 5, there is very little diver-
gence in the scenarios' export projections through 2020, 
and they match the planned/proposed FSU capacity in 
Table 5 very closely. After 2020 the scenarios start to 
diverge. Excluding the two Case C scenarios (which rep-
2050 
B Cl C2 IIASA-WEC 
254 212 195 93-620 
71 84 84 36-193 
46 31 0-370 
115 69 68 0-72 
18 18 18 70-329 
290 304 304 73-682 
75 65 31 173-955 
68 62 54 3-49 
resent a challenging direction that the world is so far 
steering well away from), the choice for FSU after 2020 
will be whether to pursue an Al/A3 strategy or an A2/B 
strategy. The former leads to high domestic consump-
tion, but low exports and no need for new export capa-
city. The latter leads to flat domestic gas consumption, 
but higher exports and a need for new export capacity. Of 
course, the choice among possible energy strategies will 
depend on many other considerations, including projec-
ted revenues from gas exports. These are just the implica-
tions that the choice is projected to have on the question 
of whether and by how much to expand export capacity 
in view of expected demand patterns. 
For MEA, there does not appear to be a robust short-
term strategy. The choice seems to be between strategi-
cally pursuing an A3 strategy, in which case current 
capacity expansion plans and proposals would need to be 
increased only slightly, or targeting any of the other 
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scenarios, in which case current plans and pro-
posals should be scaled back - in Case B by as much as 
70%. 
For the third exporting region, PAS, the situation is 
·somewhat similar. The short-term choice appears to be 
between an A3 strategy and one targeting anything but 
A3. An A3 strategy would require increasing current 
planned and proposed additions by about 35 bcm (70%). 
The other scenarios (excluding Case C) would require 
more modest increases, 10-15 bcm. Short-term choices 
should, however, take into account the longer-term pro-
jections. For all scenarios but A3, exports drop after 2020 
and export capacity will have to be retired. A mistaken 
bet on A3 could thus be expensive. Even in Scenario A3 
exports drop quite quickly after 2040. For PAS it may be 
most important to know when to stop building, rather 
than when to start. 
For WEU, planned and proposed capacity additions 
for 2020 are sufficient for all but Scenario A3 (a capacity 
shortfall of 47 bcm, 14%) and Scenario Al (only 5 bcm 
short, or 2%). But imports increase steeply after 2020 in 
all but Scenario Al (and Case C). Thus there is time to 
delay planning new capacity additions and monitor how 
gas consumption evolves. But if trends are in the direc-
tion of Scenarios A2, A3, or B, it will be important that 
such monitoring leads to timely additions to planned 
capacity expansions. 
For EEU the short-term robust strategy is to add to 
current plans and proposals for expansion. Exactly how 
much should be contingent upon how gas use evolves in 
the region. Particular attention should be paid to trends 
that correspond to Scenario Al , in which imports start to 
drop after 2020, or to trends that correspond to Scenario 
A3, which requires the greatest capacity additions, 90% 
above current plans and proposals by 2020. 
For PAO, the short-term choice (again excluding Case 
C) is between pursuing an Al /A3 strategy, for which 
current plans are a bit high, or an A2/ B strategy, in which 
case some additional capacity would be needed. Note 
that in Fig. 4 all four of these scenarios have essentially 
the same gas imports in 2010, so there might be less 
opportunity for an adaptive approach to capacity addi-
tions as suggested for EEU. Note also that for all four of 
these scenarios imports start to drop immediately after 
2020. While this suggests that mistaken bets on high 
imports might be particularly expensive, that conclusion 
is somewhat mitigated by the nature of this region. PAO 
includes both Japan and Australia, so that while net 
imports to the region may drop after 2030, Japan may 
well still be able to make good use of its import facilities 
for Australian gas. 
As in PAO, gas imports in CPA diverge little through 
2010. But CPA 's divergence thereafter is even greater 
than PA O's. In Scenario A2 and Case B, both of which 
make extensive use of coal, CPA's gas imports in 2020 go 
almost to zero. In Scenario A3 they climb at 10% per 
year. In the short term, CPA's choice appears to be 
between strategically pursuing an A3 strategy (adding to 
current capacity expansion plans and proposals) or 
a strategy based on anything but A3, in which case 
current plans and proposals should be scaled back, dras-
tically so for Scenario A2 or Case B. As shown in Fig. 4, 
this will also be the longer-term choice for CPA's gas 
import strategy, between Scenario A3 (necessitating large 
capacity increases) and everything else (where imports 
drop essentially to zero). 
The only conclusion that can be drawn from Table 
5 and Fig. 4 concerning SAS is that either current plans 
and proposals are especially over-ambitious or the treat-
ment of SAS gas imports in the IIASA-WEC scenarios 
should be revisited. On the one hand, given the lack of 
divergence in the IIASA-WEC scenarios through 2030, 
we believe that they need a closer look before they could 
justify conclusions concerning the relative wisdom of 
current SAS plans and proposals in Table 4. On the other 
hand, 75% of the planned additions to India's import 
capacity consist of piped gas from MEA and FSU, and 
experts have raised doubts on the economic and political 
wisdom of such plans (Klaassen et al., 1999). 
5. Concluding observations and discussion 
In this paper we have compared existing, planned, and 
proposed Eurasian infrastructures for natural gas trans-
port, i.e., pipelines and LNG facilities, to interregional 
trade flows projected in the six IIASA-WEC scenarios. 
Our purpose was to identify capacity expansion strat-
egies that are robust across scenarios, in cases where such 
strategies exist. Where they do not exist, we have sought 
to identify scenarios that match current plans and propo-
sals (for regions wishing to proactively pursue policies to 
raise the probability of the future matching their plans) 
and to identify adjustments needed to make current plans 
consistent with different scenarios (for regions wishing to 
adapt their plans to raise the probability that they match 
the future suggested by evolving trends). 
For FSU, there does exist a short-term robust strategy 
across the IIASA-WEC scenarios - continue with cur-
rent plans. For WEU only Scenario A3 would require 
significant new expansion by 2020, but trends should be 
monitored in anticipation of possible steep import in-
creases after 2020 if developments follow the patterns of 
Scenarios A2, A3, or B. For EEU the short-term robust 
strategy is to add to current expansion plans and propo-
sals contingent upon how gas use evolves in the region. 
Most important would be trends corresponding to Scen-
ario Al, in which imports drop after 2020, or to Scenario 
A3, which requires the largest new capacity additions. 
For PAS, a gas exporter, moderate additions to current 
plans and proposals are needed in all cases, and more 
substantial additions would be needed to prepare for 
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a future approximating Scenario A3. CPA's choice ap-
pears to be between strategically pursuing an A3 strategy 
(adding to current capacity expansion plans and propo-
sals) or a strategy based on anything but A3, in which 
case current p1ans and proposals should be scaled back. 
MEA has a similar situation, except from the exporter's 
perspective. Planned and proposed capacities are 
just below the export level in the high-gas Scenario 
A3, but are well above projected exports in all other 
scenarios. Note that the excessive export capacity 
(except for Scenario A3) planned or proposed for MEA 
is one reason that the import capacity planned or pro-
posed for SAS is so much higher than the imports projec-
ted in the scenarios. Planned and proposed export 
capacities for MEA, and import capacities for SAS, in-
clude a number of very uncertain proposals for pipelines 
through Pakistan or deep under the Indian Ocean. But 
while these capacity projections therefore deserve to be 
taken with a grain of salt, so too do the import projec-
tions in the scenarios for SAS. Given their initial lack of 
divergence across the scenarios, we believe they need 
a closer look before they could justify conclusions con-
cerning the relative wisdom of current SAS plans and 
proposals. 
Some caveats are in order to provide perspective on 
the above conclusions. First, estimates of eventual capac-
ities in 2020 based on current plans and proposals de-
pend crucially on the (technical) lifetimes that are 
assumed for various infrastructures. The numbers in 
brackets in Table 4 correspond to 40-year lifetimes in-
stead of the 35-year lifetimes underlying the numbers 
quoted above. As is evident from the table, the extra five 
years sometimes make a substantial difference. Thus life-
time extensions can to some extent substitute for capacity 
additions. Second, there are currently no pipelines con-
necting the European and Asian Pacific markets, and all 
six IIASA-WEC scenarios assume this situation con-
tinues. That is, while the models underlying the scenarios 
incorporate the possibility of expanding pipeline capaci-
ties between, say, FSU and WEU, they do not include the 
possibility of new interregional connections between par-
ticularly FSU as an exporter and CPA, SAS, and PAO as 
importers. What might happen in scenarios where that 
constraint is relaxed? The results summarized in Figs. 4 
and 5 do not provide a clear indication of what to expect. 
If we compare the panel for CPA gas consumption in 
Fig. 4 with the panel for FSU gas exports in Fig. 5, we 
find that the high consumption scenarios for CPA (Al 
and A3) are the low export scenarios for FSU. Perhaps 
this means that an increased focus on gas will generally 
give FSU more reasons to increase consumption at home 
than to increase exports abroad. In that case, adding the 
possibility of pipelines between FSU and CPA might 
have no significant impact on gas trade. Alternatively, 
FSU exports may be low in Scenarios Al and A3 because 
the worldwide focus on gas development in these 
scenarios (and also on oil development in Scenario Al) 
benefits FSU's principal export competitor (MEA) more 
than it benefits FSU, particularly in the Western and 
Eastern European markets where they compete. Perhaps, 
if FSU had pipelines through which to expand exports to 
CPA and SAS in these high-gas scenarios, it might ex-
pand its exports eastward and southward as much as 
MEA expands its exports northward. 
In addition, our assessment of the robustness of pos-
sible strategies does not account for the political wisdom, 
nor for the full economic implications, of plans for 
exporting large amounts of gas. It is obvious that both 
for India and other countries (such as China and West-
ernEurope) political considerations and risk perceptions 
play an important role in determining the desirability of 
importing large amounts of gas from a small number of 
countries. These considerations go beyond the capabili-
ties of the models used for this paper which seek to meet 
expected energy and gas demand at the lowest possible 
cost without taking into account political risk percep-
tions. 
Moreover, the fact that we use a very high level of 
spatial aggregation into 11 world regions may mask 
important international gas trade flows that take place 
within these regions. Examples are flows from Australia 
to Japan, or from Norway to Europe or from Turkmenis-
tan/Kazakhstan to Russia. Further disaggregation 
would shed more light on these international gas 
trade flows and might affect the conclusions on the 
robustness of strategies. For the FSU for example 
the robustness of strategies might differ between 
Russia and Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan. For Russia 
the trade-off between the benefits of domestic 
consumption versus additional gas export revenues 
might be more relevant than for countries with smaller 
populations and lower domestic gas demands such as 
Kazakhstan or Azerbaidzhan. It might therefore be wor-
thwhile to eventually combine the broad scope of this 
study with a higher level of disaggregation for a specific 
number of countries. 
Thus, while the results presented here do allow con-
clusions about alternative strategies in the absence of 
pipeline links between the eastern and western Eurasian 
gas markets, and while they allow us to speculate about 
adding pipelines, they cannot rule out much of the range 
of such speculations. The bottom line is that clear 
answers to the questions raised by possible pipeline 
links will require additional scenarios that examine 
those possibilities explicitly. Preliminary results of 
such new scenarios (Klaassen et al., 2000) for a modest 
GDP growth case (similar to the IIASA-WEC Case B) 
suggest that the availability of international gas pipelines 
between the FSU and Asia enable gas use to be signifi-
cantly higher, especially in CPA and SAS. These pipe-
lines could also largely replace LNG imports over the 
next 50 years. 
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